A Temporary Disability Is Still a Disability, the Third Circuit Clarifies

Follow us on LinkedIn to see future News.

Patricia Tsipras

October 7, 2024

To prove disability discrimination, plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) they have a disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); (2) they are otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) they have suffered an adverse employment decision because of discrimination.

Plaintiffs are disabled within the meaning of the ADA if they (a) have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of their major life activities; (b) have a record of such an impairment; or (c) are regarded as having such an impairment.

The pre-2008 standard under the ADA required an impairment to be “permanent or long term” to qualify as a disability.  In 2008, with the passage of the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), an impairment lasting fewer than six months still can be deemed “substantially limiting” under the ADA.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently had an opportunity to reinforce this key development.  Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, No. 23-1747 (3d Cir. Sept. 4. 2024).

Andrew Morgan worked as a millwright laborer for Allison Crane & Rigging, LLC (Allison Crane).  In September 2020, Morgan injured his lower back on the job but he completed his shift, as well as his shifts for the remainder of the week.  Morgan informed his supervisor of the injury and, two days later, began treatment with a chiropractor.  The chiropractor diagnosed Morgan with a bulged or herniated disc, recommended that Morgan return twice per week for treatment, and recommended light duty work from October 8 to November 25, 2020, including no bending or lifting heavy objects.  Morgan followed the chiropractor’s treatment plan and provided the chiropractor’s notes to his supervisors, who assigned him light duty tasks.

On November 13, 2020, Allison Crane warned Morgan because he failed to wear appropriate protective equipment while working.  A few days later, due to a conflict with a chiropractor appointment and his inability to sit for extended periods without aggravating his back injury, Morgan declined an assignment to drive a truck to escort a crane from a job.  Although Morgan offered to perform other light duty work, Allison Crane terminated Morgan’s employment on November 18, 2020 for failing to follow the company’s “day off request process as well as other policies.”

Morgan sued, alleging that Allison Crane discriminated and retaliated against him and failed to accommodate him in violation of the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) due to his temporary back injury.  Morgan also alleged wrongful discharge in violation of Pennsylvania common law.[1]  The district court dismissed Morgan’s discrimination claim, finding that he had not provided sufficient medical evidence of a disability; his pain was transitory because he was placed on lifting restrictions for less than six months; his pain was minor because he missed no work, his bending and lifting restrictions were only mildly limiting; he suffered no other restrictions; and no surgical intervention was required.  Morgan appealed.

In reversing the district court’s decision on the discrimination claim,[2] the Third Circuit determined that the court applied an outdated standard.  The standard under the ADAAA focuses on whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, regardless of the impairment’s duration.  The ADA defines major life activities to include walking, sitting, bending, and lifting.  Morgan testified that “it hurt to sit, hurt to walk,” hurt to “turn[] left or right,” and that his chiropractor imposed bending and lifting restrictions.  The Third Circuit, therefore, concluded that the district court should have evaluated whether Morgan’s impairment substantially limited those major life activities as compared to the general population.  Although courts may consider an impairment’s duration in its analysis, duration is no longer dispositive.[3]

The court also analyzed Morgan’s claim under the “regarded as” prong of the ADA.  The “regarded as” prong of the ADA protects individuals when their employer perceives them as having an impairment, even if the impairment does not qualify as a disability under the statute.  Under this prong, the ADAAA continues to exclude impairments that are transitory (lasting fewer than six months) and minor.  However, whether an impairment is minor must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.  As noted above, Morgan’s impairment was not considered minor.[4]

Employers:  The duration of an employee’s impairment is a factor to consider in determining whether the employee is disabled, but that factor is not determinative.  If an employee has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, you should engage in the interactive process with the employee and provide reasonable accommodations unless doing so would pose an undue hardship.  Seek counsel for assistance.

 

The author of this article, Patricia Tsipras is a member of the Bar of Pennsylvania.  This article is designed to provide one perspective regarding recent legal developments, and is not intended to serve as legal advice in Pennsylvania, New York, or any other jurisdiction, nor does it establish an attorney-client relationship with any reader of the article where one does not exist.  Always consult an attorney with specific legal issues.

 

[1]              Morgan alleged that Allison Crane terminated his employment for filing a worker’s compensation claim.  The district court dismissed Morgan’s claim for lack of evidence that he filed or told anyone at Allison Crane that he intended to file a worker’s compensation claim.  The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of this claim.

[2]              In addition to reversing the district court’s decision on Morgan’s discrimination claim, the Third Circuit vacated the decision because the district court failed entirely to consider Morgan’s retaliation or failure to accommodate claims.

[3]              As to the sufficiency of Morgan’s medical evidence, the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that a spinal injury, such as Morgan’s, is not within the comprehension of a jury and, thus, medical evidence was necessary.

[4]              The Third Circuit further noted that courts must interpret the PHRA in harmony with the ADA.

 
© 2026 Rubin Fortunato. All rights reserved. Disclaimer | Privacy Policy | Sitemap
Lisi
Rubin Fortunato
Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies so that we can provide you with the best user experience possible. Cookie information is stored in your browser and performs functions such as recognising you when you return to our website and helping our team to understand which sections of the website you find most interesting and useful.